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COLLEGE PLAY AND THE FLSA: WHY STUDENT-ATHLETES SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED As "EMPLOYEES" UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

ACT
Geoffrey J. Rosenthal*
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the 2014-15 academic year, twenty-four
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") Division 11 public2
athletic programs each generated revenue in excess of $100 million.
Texas A&M University led the way with the third-highest recorded
single-year operating revenue ever, with roughly one-quarter of its
$192.6 million coming from ticket sales to various athletic events.3
Further down the list-but hardly struggling-was the University of
Oklahoma, which took in just over $134 million in total revenue, with
the bulk coming from rights and licensing fees, along with ticket sales
and contributions.4 Oklahoma is likely to improve these numbers in6
2017, 5 as its football team was a title contender and boasted a Heisman
Trophy winner, quarterback Baker Mayfield.7 But Mayfield, despite
* J.D. 2017, University of Virginia School of Law; B.S. 2014, Cornell University. I am very
appreciative of my family's support and willingness to take late-night phone calls while I completed
this Article during my 3L year at the University of Virginia. I would also like to thank Professor
George Rutherglen for his guidance during the writing process. Thanks also to the editors of the
Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journalfor their careful and diligent review.
1. "Division I" consists of nearly 350 public and private colleges and universities, which
together support more than 6,000 athletic teams and encompass more than 170,000 student-athletes.
About Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/aboutdivision=dl (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
Division I is further subdivided based on football sponsorship, with the most competitive 128 teams
belonging to the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS). See id.
2. Steve
Berkowitz
et
al.,
NCAA
Finances: 2014-15,
USA
TODAY
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). Financial data for private
institutions is incomplete or unavailable.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. In 2016, Oklahoma's total athletic revenues ballooned to over $150 million, due largely in
part to private contributions.
6. The Heisman is given out to the nation's top men's football player each year.
7. Keith Sargeant, Oklahoma's Baker Mayfield wins Heisman, NJ.COM,
http://www.nj.com/rutgersfootball/index.ssf/2017/12/heismanballot-oklahomasbaker mayfield.ht
ml (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
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having his #6 jersey featured prominently on Oklahoma's "Official
Online Store," 8 will not earn a single cent for his efforts. 9 Nor will any
of the "student-athletes" that make up the Texas A&M program or any
of the other student-athletes that compete for an NCAA Division I
school.' 0 Citing a desire to "[m]aintain amateurism," the NCAA
prohibits its member schools from paying a "salary" to an athlete for
participating in athletics." And despite the inordinate amount of success
of its member programs, along with the nearly $1 billion in revenue that
the NCAA itself generated during the 2014 fiscal year,' 2 this "no pay for
play" standard is perfectly legal because student-athletes are not
recognized as "employees" by any federal or state law and are therefore
13
not entitled to the benefits or any protections that those laws afford.
Though there have been efforts to fight for the rights of studentathletes, those attempts have thus far failed. In NLRB v. Northwestern
University, for example, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")
dismissed a petition by Northwestern University football players by
denying jurisdiction, thus refuting the notion that student-athletes are
employees. 14 Likewise, in a 2015 antitrust case, the Ninth Circuit
vacated the lower court's decision to allow schools to pay studentathletes up to $5,000 per year in deferred compensation because
"offering [student-athletes] cash sums untethered to educational
expenses" would effectively turn the NCAA into a professional minor
league and would not allow the NCAA to maintain its "tradition of

8. Oklahoma Sooners Jerseys, OFFICIAL ONLINE STORE OF THE
SOONERS,
http://shop.soonersports.com/College_OklahomaSooners (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
9. Darren Rovell, NCAA President: No Pay For Players on Jersey Sales, CNBC (Dec. .22,
2011,
4:21
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/45768248;
see , also Amateurism, NCAA,

http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
10. See Darren Rovell, NCAA President: No Pay For Players on Jersey Sales, CNBC (Dec.
22, 2011, 3:51 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/45768248.
11. Id.
12. See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY
(Mar. 11,
2015, 3:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/03/11/ncaa-

financial-statement-2014-l-billion-revenue/70161386 Much of this success is due to a $700 million
broadcasting deal with CBS and Turner Broadcasting for the rights to the NCAA Division I men's
basketball tournament in March. See id.
13. See, e.g., Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845, 857 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
14. See NLRB v. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 6-7 (Aug. 17, 2015);
see also Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players' Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-says-northwesternfootball-players-cannot-unionize.html (noting that Northwestern University "effectively deni[ed]

their claim that they are university employees [under the National Labor Relations Act] and should
be allowed to collectively bargain").
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amateurism."
Despite a rash of media attention focused on the aforementioned
Northwestern and O'Bannon v. NCAA cases, student-athletes hoping to
one day be paid for the services they provide their schools might be best
served by pursuing their goal under a different federal statute. The Fair
Labor Standards Act ('FLSA" or the "Act"), passed in 1938, is "the
bedrock of employment law."' 6 The FLSA requires that every employer
pay to each of his employees at least a statutorily defined minimum
wage. 17 The statute also forbids employers from employing any of their
employees for longer than forty hours per week unless the employee is
compensated with overtime pay (time and one-half). 18 Unlike the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which applies only to private
employers, the FLSA applies to all employees, in both the private and
public sector, whose work regularly involves interstate commerce. 19
Though the FLSA's definitions section tends to be unhelpful in
determining who counts as an "employee, 2 ° the Supreme Court has
consistently found that the Act's definitions should be read broadly and
"comprehensive[ly] enough to require its application to many persons
and working relationships which, prior to this Act, were not deemed to
fall within an employer-employee category.' 2 1 In addition, the
Department of Labor ("DOL") supports the idea that "[t]he FLSA's
definition of employ ... and the later developed 'economic realities test'
provide a broader scope of employment than the common law control
test.... [The FLSA's definition of 'employ'] clearly covers more
workers as employees. 2 2 Yet, despite the FLSA's apparent structural
15. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2015) (requiring the NCAA to
permit its schools to provide up to the cost of attendance to their student athletes).
16. D. Aaron Lacy, The Disenfranchisement of the Federal Employee. Why the Federal
Government Does Not Follow the Fair Labor Standards Act, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 403, 404
(2002).

17. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
18. Id. § 207(a).
19.

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #14:

COVERAGE UNDER THE FAIR LABOR

STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfsl4.pdf (last updated
July 2009).
20. The FLSA unhelpfully defines the term "employee" as "any individual employed by an
employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2014). The term "employ" means "to suffer or permit to work."
Id. § 203(g). "Work" is not defined by the statute. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.6-785.7 (documenting the
Supreme Court's formulation of what it means to "work" under the FLSA).,
21. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947); see also Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992).
22. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ADMINISTRATOR'S INTERPRETATION No. 2015-1 (July 15, 2015),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/Misclassification/AI-2015_ .pdf (addressing the identification of
employees who are misclassified as independent contractors).
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advantages over the NLRA, just one federal court has had the
opportunity to address the question of whether the Act's protections
should be extended to student-athletes.
This Article argues that student-athletes should be classified as
'employees" under the Fair Labor Standards Act and should therefore be
entitled to the federally mandated minimum wage, as well as the Act's
full protections. Part II of this Article explains the Southern District of
Indiana's decision in Berger v. NCAA, where it ruled that members of
the University of Pennsylvania track and field team were not
"employees" and therefore not entitled to the FLSA's protections. Part
II also introduces the economic realities test, the primary test utilized by
courts to determine whether a worker should be deemed an "employee"
under the FLSA. Part III dissects and refutes the court's reasoning in
Berger and makes the case that student-athletes are both economically
dependent on their universities and subject to an extensive amount of
control, both of which are indicative of employee status. Finally, Part
IV addresses potential paths forward for the courts and focuses on the
practical realities of a legal framework that allows student-athletes to be
paid under the FLSA.
II. BERGER AND THE ECONOMIC

REALITIES TEST

A. Berger: An Issue ofFirstImpression
In Berger v. NCAA, a federal court decided for the first time the
question of whether student-athletes are "employees" under the FLSA,
ultimately finding that the named plaintiffs were not. 24 The plaintiffscurrent and former members of the University of Pennsylvania's track
and field team-sued the NCAA and 123 member schools on behalf of
themselves and all current and former NCAA Division I students from
25
2012-13 to the present.
The plaintiffs alleged that, "by virtue of their
participation on the team," they were entitled to be paid at least the
minimum wage for the work that they performed as student-athletes.2 6
In their Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs primarily focused on the
argument that, as student-athletes, they are comparable to federal workstudy participants, who are both recognized and paid as employees under
23. See Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
24. Id. at 857.
25. Id. at 846-47. As an initial matter, the court ruled that all of the defendants, other than the
University of Pennsylvania, were to be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 849.
26. Id. at 847.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss1/6
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the FLSA. 27 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued, student-athletes perform
non-academic work that is unrelated to any degree or academic program,
and in exchange for which they receive no academic credit. 28 The
Amended Complaint also alleged that, unlike work-study participants,
student-athletes are "subject to stricter supervision by a full-time
staff... hired expressly to supervise them," perform "rigorous" hours
preparing for and participating in NCAA athletics, and confer many
tangible and intangible benefits on NCAA Division I Member Schools.2 9
Further, the plaintiffs argued that the scholarships granted by NCAA
schools to some student-athletes are not compensation because, inter
alia, those scholarships are "not treated as taxable income," are granted
to ease "the academic cost of attendance and facilitate maintenance of
academic eligibility," and are not offered to every student-athlete. 30 The
plaintiffs also noted that scholarships granted to students participating in
work-study programs do not allow the school to forego paying that
31
student the minimum wage for his or her work-study participation.
After first dismissing the plaintiffs' argument that the studentathletes' employment status should be determined by reference to the
DOL "Intern Fact Sheet," the court articulated that it would have to
examine the "economic reality" of the working relationship and take into
account "the totality of the circumstances. 32 Ultimately, the Southern
District of Indiana ruled, as a matter of law, that "the fact that the
Plaintiffs participate in an NCAA athletic team at Penn does not make
them employees of Penn for FLSA purposes.

33

Notably, the court

decided to forego the use of a multifactor-driven economic realities test
and decided instead to focus on the policy rationales that contributed to
the "totality of the circumstances" of the employment relationship.34
The court essentially made two arguments. First, the court cited a
1984 Supreme Court case for the proposition that the United States has a
"revered tradition of amateurism in college sports."'35 According to the
27. Amended Complaint & Jury Demand at 5, Berger etal.
v. NCAA, No. 1:14-cv-1710 (S.D.
Ind. Mar. 18, 2015) (pointing out the irony that students who work at food service counters or sell
programs at athletic events are typically paid but not the student-athletes themselves).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at6.
31. Id.at7.
32. Berger v.NCAA,162 F.Supp. 3d 845, 850-51, 855 (S.D.Ind.2016) (finding that the case
required a "flexible approach").
33. Id. at 857.
34. Id. at 856 ("[T~he factors.., fail to capture the nature of the relationship between the
Plaintiffs, as student athletes, and Penn.").
35. Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S 85, 120 (1984)).
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court, this tradition was an "essential part" of the economic reality of the
relationship between the student-athletes and the University of
Pennsylvania because "generations of Penn students had vied for the
opportunity to be part of that revered tradition with no thought of any
compensation. 3 6
Second, the court emphasized that, despite the
obvious existence of thousands of unpaid student-athletes on college
campuses, the Department37of Labor has not taken any action to apply the
FLSA to student-athletes.
Despite the court's resistance to classify student-athletes as
employees, Berger suggests that the arguments for maintaining the
current regime are primarily normative in nature. 38 Though the court
qualified its decision as not "expressing any opinion regarding the
broader question about whether, as a matter of philosophical principle or
general fairness, college athletes in general, or particular groups of
college athletes whose teams generate substantial revenue, should be
compensated in some way, '39 its reasoning appears to almost exclusively
engage in the policy rationale behind the NCAA's refusal to allow its
members to compensate student-athletes.4 ° Indeed, had the court chosen
to actually examine the economic reality of the relationship between
student-athletes and their universities and the NCAA-as this Article
will do in Part 11-instead of reducing the plaintiffs' argument down to
being about mere "fairness,"' perhaps a different decision could have
been reached.42
36.

Id. (finding that this "demonstrates unequivocally" that students who participate in NCAA

athletics do so because they view it as beneficial to them),
37. Id. (finding that the DOL has taken the position that "activities of students in such
programs, conducted primarily for the benefit of the participants as part of the educational
opportunities provided to the students by the school or institution"-such as intramural and
interscholastic athletics-are not "work"). The plaintiffs' argument, that section 10b03(e) of the
DOL Wage and Hour Division Field Operations Handbook (in which this position is contained) was
not intended to apply to NCAA-regulated athletics, was rejected by the court. Id. at 857. This
Article does not explicitly address the court's reliance on the DOL's inaction or the administrative

law issues that disregarding its view may implicate. There have been plenty of instances where a
federal court has chosen to disregard the DOL's viewpoint as to what constitutes an employeeemployer relationship. See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir.

2015) (rejecting DOL-articulated factors for determining the circumstances under which internships
must be compensated and instead centering the inquiry on whether the intern or the employee was
the "primary beneficiary of the relationship"), amended and superseded by Glatt v. Fox Searchlight
Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 535 (2d Cir. 2016).
38. Berger, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
39. Id at 849-50 n.5.

40. Id. at 855 (finding that the classification of student-athletes as "employees" should not be
subject to a bright line rule, but rather to a "totality of the circumstances" analysis).
41. See id. at 849 n.5.
42. In their appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that the district court
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Of course, for those who argue that student-athletes should be
classified as employees, Berger might have just not presented the right
circumstances. The University of Pennsylvania, as a member of the Ivy
League, awards neither academic nor athletic scholarships. 43 Further,
members of the Ivy League generally have stricter rules-with respect to
recruiting, game and practice schedules, and academic eligibility-than
do other schools, especially those that compete in Division I across all
sports.4 4 Thus, some have suggested that a much stronger (and maybe
successful) case could be made by a plaintiff who has participated in a
profitable or high-revenue generating sport at a school with a prominent
athletics program.4 5 Regardless, and at a minimum, the Berger case46
failed to adequately articulate a meaningful economic realities test and
subsequently failed to thoroughly examine the notion of "amateurism" in
the modem world and the relationship that student-athletes have with
their schools and the NCAA. These matters are explored in Section B
and Part III respectively.
B. FLSA 's Economic Realities Test
The "economic realities test" is the primary test utilized by courts
when seeking to determine whether a worker should be classified as an
"employee" under the FLSA.4 7 It has been described as "the default test
under federal protective legislation when the statute gives little guidance
with respect to the appropriate test of employee status .. ,48 The origin
improperly examined the "purported 'economic reality' of NCAA defined-amateurism." See
Matthew Perlman, Ex-NCAA Athletes Tell 7th Circ. FLSA Suit Wrongly Tossed, LAw360 (Mar. 17,
2016, 5:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/772651/ex-ncaa-athletes-tell-7th-circ-flsa-suitwrongly-tossed.
43.

Payingfor a Penn Education, PENN STUDENT REGISTRATION & FINANCIAL SERVICES,

http://www.srfs.upenn.edu/paying/paying-grants-scholarships.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2017).
44. See Joon Lee, How the Ivy League is Forcing Out Student-Athletes, CORNELL DAILY SUN
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://comellsun.com/2015/09/30/how-the-ivy-league-is-forcing-out-studentathletes; see also Bill Pennington, Before Recruiting in Ivy League, Applying Some Math, N.Y.
TIMEs (Dec. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/sports/before-athletic-recruiting-inthe-ivy-league-some-math.html.
45. See Edward Nassar, College Athletes' Next Play, ONLABOR BLOG (May 2, 2016),
https://onlabor.org/2016/05/02/college-athletes-next-play.
46. See Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845, 856 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
47. See J. Dalton Person, Exotic Dancers & FLSA: Are Strippers Employees?, 59 ARK. L.
REv. 173, 181 (2016); Jamie Nicole Johnson, Removing the Cloak of Amateurism: Employing
College Athletes and Creating Optional Education, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 959, 978-79 (2015). The
Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted any one formulation of the economic realities test.
48. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of
Employees and Employers Who Operate in the BorderlandBetween an Employer-And-Employee
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of the economic realities test can be traced back to the Supreme Court's
decision in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, where the issue was
whether an employer had misclassified his workers as "independent
contractors" instead of as "employees" under the FLSA.49 The Court
endorsed the lower court's view that the proper classification was to be
determined, at least in part, on the "underlying economic realities" of the
working relationship. 50 The Supreme Court built on this view more
explicitly when it found that the "test of employment" under the FLSA
for a cooperative and its workers was "the 'economic reality' rather than
[the] 'technical concepts"' of the working relationship.5
The
Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Administrator has also
recognized the economic realities test as the key tool for interpreting
coverage under the FLSA.52
Notably, no single or uniform formulation of the economic realities
test has been adopted across the courts.53 Even within circuits, courts
have tended to consider the facts, as well as the nature of the purported
employment relationship at issue (e.g., whether they are examining a
joint employment issue, an independent contractor issue, or something
else), and only then do they typically announce the various factors that
will guide them to a decision.54 Further, nearly every formulation of the
test comes with the caveat that "no one factor is dispositive" or that the
court will have to consider the "totality of the circumstances. 5 5 At its
core, however, the economic realities test-in whichever iteration it is
Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 626 (2012).
49. See id. at 726.
50. See id. at 726-27.

51.

Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961); see also Tony & Susan

Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) ("The test of employment under the Act

is one of 'economic reality."').
52. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 19 (noting the test's prominence for determining
issues related to independent contractor status); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #13: AM I AN
EMPLOYEE?: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA)

(2014), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs I3.pdf.
53. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 19.
54. See, e.g., Brown v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 755 F.3d 154, 167-69 (2d Cir. 2014)
(citing Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 329-31 (2d Cir. 2012); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840
F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir. 1988)) (recognizing that the Second Circuit has "applied several
variations of economic reality tests as best suited to particular situations," including for determining
employer status, distinguishing between employees and independent contractors, and distinguishing
between a domestic service worker and a household member).
55. See, e.g., supra notes 50-52; Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d
408, 418 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[W]hether a person functions as an employer depends on the totality of
the circumstances rather than on technical concepts of the employment relationship."); Barlow v.
C.R. Eng'g, Inc., 703 F.3d 497, 506 (10th Cir. 2012) ("None. of the factors alone is dispositive;
instead, the court must employ a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.").
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presented-focuses on the "financial reality accompanying the work"
and on "whether the individual is economically dependent on the
business to which he renders service .. ,56
Tests inquiring into the economic realities of alleged independent
contractors or joint employers are common.57 Independent contractor
and joint employee tests have been outlined by the DOL, including
detailed factors to consider, which are generally followed and adopted
by the courts. 58 These factors tend to include the extent to which the
work performed is an integral part of the employer's business, the nature
and degree of employer control, the permanence of the working
relationship, the workers' opportunities for profit or loss, and the degree
of control exercised by the employer over the workers.59 Other factors
that a court may consider (in the joint employment context, for example)
focus more on the employer's control over the worker, including the
employer's ability to hire and fire the individual, the method of
recruitment or solicitation, the degree to which the worker is supervised,
the expectations of compensation, and the employer's ability to control
the terms and conditions of employment.6 ° Still, no matter how many
factors a court articulates, it will almost always add the caveat that none
is dispositive and the totality of the circumstances must be considered.6 1
Employment relationships that do not fit into one of those two
boxes, however, can present trickier situations for the courts. 62 In these
56. Person, supra note 47, at 181, 184; Emily Bodtke, When Volunteers Become Employees:
Using a Threshold-Remuneration Test Informed by the Fair Labor Standards Act to Distinguish
Employees from Volunteers, 99 MINN. L. REv. 1113, 1119 (2015); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau,

Rethinking the Worker ClassificationTest: Employees, Entrepreneurship,and Empowerment, 34 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 67, 90 (2013); Rubinstein, supra note 46, at 625.
57. Bodtke, supra note 56, at 1119-20.
58. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #13: AM I AN EMPLOYEE?: EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (setting out six factors to consider for
determining independent contractor status); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ADMINISTRATOR'S

(2016),
11-13
at
2016-1,
No.
INTERPRETATION
https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/JointEmploymentAI.pdf (articulating seven factors to consider for
determining joint employment status).
59. See, e.g., Brock, 840 F.2d at 1058-59 (distinguishing between an "employee" and an
"independent contractor").
60. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR Drv., FACT SHEET #35: JOINT EMPLOYMENT
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) AND MIGRANT AND SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL

(2016),
(MSPA)
ACT
PROTECTION
WORKER
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs35.pdf, see, e.g., Velez v. Sanchez 693 F.3d 308,
330 (2d Cir. 2012) (determining whether the worker was subject to joint employment).
61. See, e.g., Velez, 693 F.3d at 326.
62. See, e.g., Villarreal v. Woodman, 113 F.3d 202, 205 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying a fourfactor economic realities test to determine whether pre-trial detainees were "employees" of the
correction officers or of the correctional facility).
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cases, the court may forego articulating factors and instead rely solely on
the nebulous "totality of the circumstances" analysis.63 For example, in
a case where college resident assistants argued that they were employees
under the FLSA, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the economic realities test
was controlling, but it failed to articulate any of the factors that guided
its analysis.6 4 Rather, it merely held that the resident assistants were not
employees within the meaning of the FLSA based on the "totality of the
circumstances." 65 Likewise, in deciding whether purportedly volunteer
city firefighters were "employees" or "volunteers" under the FLSA, the
Sixth Circuit noted that "[t]he issue of the employment relationship does
not lend itself to a precise test, but is to be determined on a case-by-case
66
basis upon the circumstances of the whole business activity."
Thus, it should be of no surprise that an economic realities test
seeking to determine the employment relationship between a studentathlete and his school and/or the NCAA may be difficult for a court to
conceive. Because Berger was the first case to decide the question of
whether student-athletes are employees under the FLSA, there have been
few opportunities for the courts to fashion a determinative test and little
reason for the DOL to notice. 67 In fact, at the time Berger was decided,
there had been only one other case-state or federal-where a court has
purported to apply an economic realities test to student-athletes. 68 In
Coleman v. Western Michigan Univ., a Michigan court ruled that the
student-athlete plaintiff was not an employee within the meaning of the
state's workers' compensation law. 69 In its analysis, the court examined:
(1) the proposed employer's right to control or dictate
the activities of the proposed employee; (2) the
proposed employer's right to discipline or fire the
proposed employee; (3) the payment of wages and...
the extent to which the proposed employee is dependent
upon the payment of wages... for his daily living
expenses; and (4) whether the task performed by the
63. See Velez, 693 F.3d at 331.
64. Marshall v. Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1328 (10th Cir. 1981).
65. Id.
66. Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, 727 F.3d 565, 569, 571 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (finding that the firefighters were "employees" under the Act because they
were paid hourly wages and, per Supreme Court precedent, "those who work in contemplation of
compensation are employees within the meaning of the FLSA").
67. See Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845, 851 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
68. Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 225 (Mich. 1983).
69. Id. at 228.
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proposed employee was an integral part of the proposed
employer's business.7 °
The court concluded that the student-athlete at issue was not an
employee because, even though he received compensation in the form of
grant-in-aid scholarship payments that he was dependent on for living
expenses, the student-athlete's task of playing football was not an
integral part of the university's "business" (i.e., education), and the
student himself admitted that his purpose at the university was to further
his education, not to play football.71 In Part III, I will work to debunk
some of the conclusions and assumptions made by the Coleman court.
In Berger itself, the court decided to rely solely on the "totality of
It followed the Seventh Circuit's ruling in
the circumstances. 72
73
Vanskike v. Peters that the Ninth Circuit's four-factor economic
realities test did not capture the nature of the employment relationship at
hand.74 In Vanskike, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a group of
prisoners were not employees under the FLSA of either the Department
of Corrections or the State of Illinois.75 Citing Goldberg, Rutherford,
and other precedent, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the relevant inquiry
was of the "totality of the circumstances" and the "economic reality of
the working relationship." 76 The court, however, declined to apply the
four-factor standard from the Ninth Circuit that had been used in prior
prisoner cases in the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.7 7 Whereas those
cases had involved prisoners performing work for private, outside
employers on a voluntary basis (rather than by forced assignment) 78, the
prisoner in Vanskike alleged that his labor constituted forced labor, and
the dispute thus centered on whether the prisoner could "plausibly be
said to be 'employed in the relevant sense at all[j' ' 79 The court stated

70. Id. at 225-26.
71. See id. at 226-27. For a more complete discussion of Coleman, see Johnson, supra note
47, at 978.
72. Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp. 3d 856, 855 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
73. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992).
74. Berger, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
75. Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 807, 813.
76. Id. at 808 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit's factors
take into consideration "whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the
employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment,
(3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment." Id. (citing
Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)).
77. Id. at 808 (internal citations omitted).
78. Id. at 808-09.
79. Id.
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that "the [Ninth Circuit's] factors fail to capture the true nature of the
relationship for essentially they presuppose a free labor situation. Put
simply, the DOC's 'control' over Vanskike does not stem from any
remunerative relationship or bargained-for exchange of labor for
consideration, but from incarceration itself."80 Thus, because the case in
Vanskike was distinguishable from the situation dealt with by the Ninth
Circuit and other courts considering this issue, the Seventh Circuit relied
on the employee's status as a prisoner, along with the notion that
conferring employee status in this case would not further the underlying
purposes of the FLSA, to support its conclusion that no employee status
should be conferred. 81
Berger, of course, dealt with student-athletes, not prisoners, 2 but
the Southern District of Indiana likened its conundrum to that in
Vanskike.83 Because there had been no established factors with which to
conduct an economic realities test for determining the employment
relationship between student-athletes and their schools, the court in
Berger essentially engaged in an open analysis, inquiring only into the
"totality of the circumstances" of the relationship.84 But in the process,
the court did not appear to focus on anything connected to the
"economics" or to the "reality" of the relationship. 85 Rather, hiding
behind the veil of the "totality of the circumstances," the court focused
on two policy rationales that seemingly did not relate to the student-'
athletes' economic dependency or to the control that the NCAA and its
member schools exercise.8 6 In its sole allusion to the student-athletes'
economic dependency, the court found that because "generations of
Penn students have vied for the opportunity to be part of that revered
tradition with no thought of any compensation," it demonstrated
"unequivocally that the students at Penn who chose to participate in
sports.., as part of their educational experience do so because they
view it as beneficial to them." 87 Of course, an alleged employee's
"expectation of compensation" is supposed to just be one factor in the
court's reasoning, and here it seemingly served as the one and only

80.

Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992) (further noting that "[p]risoners are

essentially taken out of the national economy upon incarceration. When they are assigned to work
within the prison... they have not contracted with the government to become its employees").
81. See id. at 810 n.5.
82. Though some college students would likely argue that the two are indistinguishable.
83. See Berger, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 855-56.
84. See id. at 855.

85. See id. at 855-57.
86. See id. at 856.

87. Id.
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factor88 that was tied directly to the student-athletes' economic reality. It
was this reasoning, 89 along with the court's nod to the NCAA's
commitment to amateurism and the DOL's inaction, that sealed the
student-athletes' fate.
Overall, there is no overarching agreement as to what factors (if
any) are relevant to an analysis under the economic realities test.
Regardless of which factors a court chooses, it will usually consider the
totality of the circumstances before making its decision. In Part III, I
argue that the court in Berger-having passed on the opportunity to
articulate a clear set of factors-ultimately failed to take the totality of
the student-athletes' economic circumstances into account.
III.

DEBUNKING BERGER:

THE

LANDSCAPE OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS

This Part will repudiate the main policy rationales used to justify
the decision in Berger and will set out to prove that if a court were to
truly apply an objective economic realities test, then the legal conclusion
that student-athletes are deserving of "employee" status is difficult to
ignore. This Part begins by rebuffing the notion that there exists a
"revered tradition of amateurism in the NCAA." 90 I then outline the
various ways in which student-athletes are controlled by their schools, as
well as the ways in which they are economically dependent on their
schools and the NCAA. Finally, this Part establishes that college
athletics is a big business and certainly an industry whose primary
purpose could be considered something other than "education."
A. The Myths ofAmateurism and the "Revered Tradition"

The NCAA claims that "[a]mateur competition is a bedrock
principle of college athletics and the NCAA." 91 This notion appears
prominently in NCAA literature and has been repeated by the NCAA's
president, Mark Emmert. 92 As a result, "[a]ll incoming student-athletes
must be certified as amateurs ...[and] are required to adhere to NCAA

88. Id. at 854, 856.
89. See id. at 854, 856-57.
90. See id. at 856 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 129
(1984)).
91. NCAA Amateurism, supra note 7.
92. See, e.g., Gary Brown, Emmert Urges Values BasedApproach in Speech, NCAA (Jan. 17,
2013),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/emmert-urges-values-basedapproach-speech.
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amateurism requirements in order to remain eligible for intercollegiate
competition., 93 The NCAA has adopted these rules in order "to ensure
the students' priority remains on obtaining a quality educational
94
experience and that all of student-athletes are competing equitably.,
The rules are strict, 95 and violations can destroy a student-athlete's
eligibility and athletic career. 96 Even the Supreme Court has recognized
that there exists in this country a "revered tradition of amateurism in
college sports." 97 Indeed, the court in Berger pointed to the Supreme
Court's emphasis on amateurism as some evidence that student-athletes
should not be paid under the FLSA.9 8 But a closer look at the United
States' history of amateur competition, including the development of the
NCAA's conception of amateurism and the term "student-athlete," casts
doubt on just how "revered" this tradition really is.
The notion that there is a "revered tradition of amateurism in
college sports" in the United States stems from the 1984 Supreme Court
case, NCAA v. Board of Regents, in which the University of Oklahoma
and the University of Georgia argued that the NCAA had unreasonably
restrained trade by placing restrictions on the televising of college
football games. 99 Affirming the lower court's decision that the NCAA
had violated the Sherman Act, the Court noted that:
[t]he NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a
revered traditionof amateurism in college sports. There

93.

Id. (stating that these amateurism requirements do not allow student-athletes to, inter alia,'

enter into contracts with professional teams, accept a salary for participating in athletics, accept
prize money above actual and necessary expenses, or to receive benefits from an agent or
prospective agent).
94. Id.
95.

See Ben Cohen, The Case for Paying College Athletes, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2011),

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424053111904060604576572752351110850
("NCAA
athletes are held to what is, essentially, the strictest code of amateurism in sports. It's not just that
the rules prevent them from driving a booster's Ferrari to Las Vegas for the weekend. The rules can
make them think twice before bumming a ride to the mall.").
96. Take the case of Silas Nacita, a walk-on Baylor University football player who was
homeless when he began school in 2014. See, e.g., Maxwell Strachan, Baylor Rules Former
Homeless Football Player is Permanently Ineligible for Accepting Food, Housing, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2015/04/08/silas-nacita-ncaa-permanently-

ineligible- n 7028230.html. A few months later, Nacita was forced to leave the team after being
ruled permanently ineligible because he had accepted an acquaintance's offer to pay for his housing
and food. Id.

97. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. [hereinafter Bd.of Regents], 468 U.S. 85,
120 (1984).
98.

Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp. 3d 856 (S.D. Ind. 2016).

99. Bd.of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88, 120.
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can be no question ... that it needs ample latitude to
play that role, or that the preservation of the studentathlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to
intercollegiate athletics ....100
As a consequence of the case, major colleges and conferences were
able to sign their own television contracts, independent of the NCAA.'0 1
This freedom, along with the growth of cable television, led to a
significant increase in the number of televised college sporting events in
Ironically, then, the Supreme Court's
the 1980s and 1990s. 10 2
decision-in the very same case where it emphasized the importance and
purity of amateurism-actually increased the public's exposure to
college sports and allowed for the "infusion of commercialization
''1 3
through increased media exposure and media-generated revenues.
The rise of college sports as a significant and commercially driven
business over the past thirty years is examined further in Part III.C.
Putting aside whether the so-called tradition of amateurism has
continued in the thirty years since Board of Regents, it is questionable
whether there was even a tradition in the first place. According to sports
historian Dr. Ronald Smith, "[a]mateurism certainly did not exist in the
big-time institutions as the 20th century came into being[.]...
Amateurism in American colleges is an anachronism."'1° 4 Smith argues
that American universities have used the term 'amateur' but have
developed a professional model.10 5 Though college and university
athletic programs described themselves as amateur, "the result was 10 a6
highly professional model emphasizing excellence and winning."
This "professional model" is most obviously demonstrated by the way in
100. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
10 1. See RONALD A. SMITH, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATIONS AND CONFERENCES,
IN SPORTS IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 490 (Steven A.

Riess ed., 2015).
102. Id.
103. Thomas A. Baker & Natasha T. Brison, From Board of Regents to O'Bannon: How
Antitrust and Media Rights Have Influenced College Football, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 344
(2016).
104. Ronald A. Smith, History of Amateurism in Men's Intercollegiate Athletics: The
Continuance of a 19th Century Anachronism in America, 45 QUEST J. 430, 431 (1993); see also
Lawrence M. Kahn, Cartel Behavior and Amateurism in College Sports, 121 J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 209, 211 (2007) (noting that, as football revenues rose, "numerous instances of
payments to athletes were observed in the 1940s").
105. Smith, supranote 104, at 433, 435.
106. Id. at 443 (highlighting the early and widespread practice of hiring professional coaches,
allowing students to play summer baseball for pay while still maintaining amateur status, and using
monetary scholarships to lure athletes).
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which schools recruit their student-athletes: grant-in-aid scholarships
that allow for student-athletes to technically be "compensated" in
exchange for their athletic services. 10 7 The use of athletic scholarships
dates back to at least the 1880s, when "it was the general practice among
the Ivy League schools [to recruit and pay athletes to attend college]." 10 8
Today, the NCAA highlights that 56 percent of Division I studentathletes receive some level of athletics-based financial aid. 10 9 Though
grant-in-aid is not counted as "compensation" for the purposes of the
FLSA (nor does the NCAA itself consider it "compensation") 1' 0 , the
practice has become "obviously compensatory" over the years, as
NCAA rules allow for grant-in-aid scholarships to be terminated on a
year-to-year basis. 111
Despite the inconsistency that reveals itself when schools entice
student-athletes to play an "amateur" sport with scholarships based
solely on athletic ability, the NCAA was unsuccessful in its early
attempts to eradicate the practice. For example, even after the NCAA in
1905 adopted a constitution that called for institutions to adopt "high
standards of amateurism," the practice of recruiting athletes and
awarding them scholarships continued. 112 According to Smith, "[by] the
1920s, granting scholarships to athletes, while commonly condemned by
institutions, conferences, and the NCAA, was an accepted practice in
reality. ' 1 3 In an attempt to get serious about amateurism, the "Graham
Plan" was introduced in 1935.114 The Graham Plan called for no
compensation-including scholarships-to be awarded on the basis of

107. See id. at 435.
108. Id. at 438.
109. NCAA
Recruiting
Facts,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Recruiting%20Fact%/2OSheet/20WEB.pdf (last visited Oct.
21, 2016).
110. Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete:
The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REv. 71, 112-13 (2006).
111. Id. at 113; see also, NCAA DrviSION I MANUAL, § 15.3.3.1 (2016-17),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1l7.pdf.
112. Smith, supra note 104, at 439.
113. Id. at 439 (highlighting the 1929 Carnegie Report that found "over 70% of the 112
colleges studied had some form of athletic subsidization" and concluded that "if colleges and
universities had sincerely accepted the definition of amateurs . . . the abuses of recruiting,
proselyting, and subsidizing would have disappeared overnight"); sce also Taylor Branch, The
Shame

of

College

Sports,

THE

ATLANTIC

(Oct.

2011),

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/201 1/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643
("In
1939, freshman players at the University of Pittsburgh went on strike because they were getting paid
less than their upperclassman teammates.").
114. Smith, supra note 104, at 440.
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athletic ability- by any individual or group.1 15 Adopted by a single
athletic conference, the Graham Plan was eventually
voted out of
1 16
existence after a "storm of protest from alumni groups."'
The NCAA took greater steps toward affirming its commitment to
amateurism when in 1948 it adopted the "Sanity Code," which mandated
"that any scholarship [granted] to an athlete must be based upon
' 117
financial need and limited to tuition and incidental institutional fees."
The Code also prohibited the withdrawal of scholarships, "even if the
student later decided not to participate in intercollegiate athletics at
all." ' 1 8 The Sanity Code was consistently "ignored or violated," 119 and
when the NCAA moved to expel the Code's violators, a vote of the
entire membership failed to yield the two-thirds majority necessary to do
SO. 12 0 Finally, a little over twenty years after the Graham Plan was first
introduced, "the NCAA amended its rules and allowed athletes to
receive scholarships based on their athletic ability, and schools were
allowed to
give awards that covered tuition and fees, as well as a living
12 1
stipend.'

Interestingly, the NCAA's endorsement of grant-in-aid scholarships
came just three years after it created the term "student-athlete," a phrase
that has less to do with amateurism and more to do with avoiding legal
liability. The NCAA "adopted and mandated the term 'student-athlete'
purposely to buttress the notion that such individuals should be
considered students rather than employees.' ' 122 Specifically, the NCAA
coined the term "student-athlete" after the Colorado Supreme Court's
decision in University of Denver v. Nemeth, 123 where the court ruled that
a University of Denver football player was an "employee" under
Colorado's workers' compensation statute and was therefore entitled to
compensation for his football injures. 124 In response, the NCAA
embedded, the term "student-athletes" into all of its rules and
115. Id.
116. Id. (noting that athletic grants-in-aid continued, and not in the spirit of amateurism).
117. Id. at 441.
118. McCormick, supranote 110, at 111.
119. Smith, supra note 104, at 441 (noting that the University of Virginia, for example, "voted
unanimously to oppose the NCAA Code and to offer full athletic scholarships through its alumni
associations").
120. Id.
121. Kahn, supra note 104, at 211.
122. McCormick, supranote 10, at 84, 86 (arguing that the term "student-athlete" was created
solely to "obscure the reality of the university-athlete employment relationship and to avoid
universities' legal responsibilities as employers").
123. Id. at 83-84.
124. Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 426 (Colo. 1953).
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be identified
interpretations because it feared that "NCAA athletes could
courts." 125
as employees by state industrial commissions and
Allowing grant-in-aid scholarships only serves to increase the
degree to which student-athletes are economically dependent on their
schools. 126 Similar to the NCAA's manipulation of language in the
student-athlete context, it apparently was also concerned that these
grant-in-aid scholarships could be viewed as a form of compensation in
The NCAA "responded by
exchange for athletic services. 127
encouraging its members to use [certain] language in their athletic grantin-aid forms."'' 28 But no matter what language the NCAA uses, studentathletes who receive grant-in-aid scholarships and other forms of
financial assistance are, as a matter of basic common sense,
economically dependent on their schools. 12 9 Though the NCAA recently
changed its rules to allow schools to provide cash stipends that would
help "close the gap between scholarship money and what it actually
costs to attend school,"' 130 this change merely highlights the NCAA's3 1
recognition that student-athletes depend on this financial assistance.'
This notion is supported by the NCAA's most recent study of Division I
student-athletes, in which one-third of Division I student-athletes
reported having concerns about how their finances would impact their
ability to complete their degree, and an even greater percentage said that
"quitting their sport would make staying at their current college a

125.

McCormick, supra note 110, at 84 (quoting then-NCAA Executive Director Walter

Byers); see also WALTER BYERS & CHARLES HAMMER,
EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 69-70 (1995).

UNSPORTSMANLIKE

CONDUCT:

126. The degree to which grant-in-aid scholarships allow colleges and universities to exercise
control over their student-athletes is discussed in Part I.A and Part II.B. See discussion infra Parts
H.A, H.B.
127. McCormick, supra note 110, at 75 n.12.
128. Id. at 85-86 ("This award is made in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of
the [NCAA] pertaining to the principles of amateurism, sound academic standards, and financial aid
to student athletes .... Your acceptance of the award means that you agree with these principles and
are bound by them."). It is debatable whether this concern was warranted. In the O'Bannon
decision, the Ninth Circuit distinguished grant-in-aid scholarships from the compensation that
student-athletes might receive by being able to market their names, images, and likenesses. See
O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015) ("The difference between offering
student-athletes education-related compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to
educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis
for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point.").
129. McCormick, supra note 110, at 117 ("Grant-in-aid athletes at Division I NCAA
institutions are deeply economically dependent upon their universities.").
130. Chris Isidore, College Athletes Finally Getting Some Cash, CNN MONEY (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/04/news/companies/extra-cash-college-athletes.
131. Id
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132

problem financially.,
Though "amateurism" is commonly viewed as a "revered tradition"
in college athletics, much of this tradition is superficial. It has been
perpetuated by the NCAA primarily to avoid the dreaded possibility of
being viewed (or having one of its members be viewed) as an employer,
and the concept has been eroded by its members as much as possible in
order to achieve the greatest degree of competitive success. This history
of professional-like practices in the NCAA should also put to rest the
point made in Berger that "generations of students" have participated in
college athletics with no thought of compensation.' 33 On the contrary,
student-athletes of past generations always fought for and desired
compensation of some kind. And as demonstrated in Part III.B below,
today's student-athletes have the same desire for compensation, but they
face severe consequences if they pursue such benefits.
B. Students in Name Only: Institutional Control and Student-Athlete
Economic Dependence
All college students are subject to their institution's rules and
policies. For example, students at most universities may have to enroll
in a certain number of credits each semester or earn a certain minimum
GPA in order to maintain full-time residency status and/or receive
financial aid and scholarships. These "burdens" are all consistent with
these students' roles as students, regardless of the extracurricular
activities in which they may participate. Student-athletes, however, are.
subject to an exceptionally higher level of control by their schools,
which are in turn held accountable by the NCAA for violations of
NCAA rules and principles. Ultimately, the responsibilities placed on
student-athletes, and the time that is demanded of them, are more akin to
that of professional athletes than it is ordinary college students.
The NCAA's Division I manual delineates, in copious detail, the
various rules, bylaws, and governing principles that both schools and
students must abide by if they are to remain members in good
standing.' 34 For violations of any of its rules, the NCAA can impose
sanctions, "which range from a temporary reduction in scholarships, to
132. NCAA, GOALS Study of the Student Athlete Experience: Initial Summary of Findings
[hereinafter
GOALS
Study],
NCAA,
3
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/GOALS_2015 sunnaryjan2016_final_20160627.pdf.
133. Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845, 856 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
134. See
NCAA
DIVISION
I
MANUAL
(2016-17),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/DI 17.pdf.
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suspension of a program from postseason play, all the way up to the
requirement that a school eliminate a certain team and ... measures that
indirectly threaten the school's academic accreditation. '135 If a studentathlete violates a bylaw, he may face extreme consequences. For
example, the NCAA ruled a University of Minnesota wrestler to be
ineligible after he made available for download an original song because
he performed under his own name and identified himself as a Minnesota
wrestler. 136 The NCAA was well within its rights, pursuant to a rule that
prohibits student-athletes from using their name, image, or status to
promote the sale of a commercial product, to take such action. But it
remains unclear why student-athletes-if they really are "students first"
and are to be treated as "amateurs"-should not be allowed to pursue the
same goals and the same activities as any other college student. If an
ordinary student, who was not a member of Minnesota's wrestling team,
decided to try his luck at selling original music, he would likely be
hailed for his entrepreneurial spirit, and not potentially have his
scholarship revoked.
Student-athletes are restricted in several other ways that normal
college students (and indeed, other students on scholarships) are not.
For instance, when a student-athlete transfers from one NCAA school to
another, he is not eligible to play in any Division I competition until he
has attended his new institution for at least two full semesters.137
Student-athletes who signed "National Letters of Intent" while in high
school may not transfer during the initial year of competition without
losing an entire season of eligibility. 138 Student-athletes who receive
grant-in-aid scholarships are also at the mercy of their schools.
Depending on various circumstances, a school can choose to reduce or
cancel a student-athlete's scholarship at the end of each period of the
award. 39 Despite new legislation passed in 2015 that prohibits most
Division I schools from canceling scholarships for athletic reasons,140
135. Kahn, supranote 104, at 211.
136. Pat Borzi, Minnesota Wrestler Loses His Eligibility by Selling a Song, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/201 3/02/28/sports/wrestler-hoping-to-inspire-through-songloses-eligibility.html.
137. NCAA DtvISION I MANUAL, supra note 134, § 14.5.5.1.
138.

About

the

National

Letter

of

Intent,

NAT'L

LETTER

OF

INTENT,

http://www.nationalletter.org/aboutTheNli/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
the
About
Questions
Asked
139. Frequently
http://www.ncaa.org/about/frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa#schola

NCAA,
NCAA,
(last visited Oct. 21,

2017). The school also may cancel the scholarship during the period of the award if the studentathlete becomes ineligible, has been found to commit a fraud, engages in misconduct, or quits the
team. Id.
140.

Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Increases Value of Scholarships in Historic Vote, USA TODAY
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the majority of Division I schools still do not offer four-year
scholarships. 141
This means that student-athletes may still find
themselves in situations where they lose their financial means for
attending school based solely on the subjective criteria and decision
making of their institution.
Division I student-athletes also devote a significant amount of time
to their sports. In a 2015 NCAA survey of 7,252 Division I studentathletes, representing 180 Division I schools, student-athletes reported
spending a median of thirty-four hours per week on athletics, with
football players reporting an in-season time commitment of forty-two
hours per week and baseball players reporting a forty-hour per week
commitment. 142 These numbers appear to be a far cry from the NCAA's
bylaw that limits "athletically related activities" to a maximum of four
hours per day and twenty hours per week.1 43 Of course, the NCAA has
built in several ways in which a school might skirt these limits. For
example, under another bylaw provision (of which the FLSA most
certainly would not approve), "[a]ll competition and any associated
athletically related activities on the day of competition shall count as
three hours regardless of the actual duration of these activities. ' 44
Likewise, the bylaws allow for unlimited "voluntary" athletically related
activity, so long as certain requirements are met.1 45 The numerous
exceptions provided for in the bylaws have the potential to result in a
situation where student-athletes spend more time being "athletes" than
they do "students. 1 46 In fact, "[t]wo-thirds of Division I and II studentathletes.., said that they spent as much time or more on athletics during
the off-season as during the competitive season. 1 47 Forget potential,
college athletics is a full-time job for many student-athletes.
Given the hours that student-athletes devote to their sports, they
must often forego other opportunities that would otherwise have been
available. Besides the obvious financial opportunities student-athletes

(Jan. 17, 2015, 4:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/17/ncaaconvention-cost-of-attendance-student-athletes-scholarships/21921073.
141. Joe Solomon, Schools Can Give Out 4-Year Athletic Scholarships,But Many Don't, CBS
SPORTS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/schools-can-give-out-4year-athletic-scholarships-but-many-dont.
142. GOALS Study, supra note 132, at 2 (also indicating that the median time devoted to
academics for a Division I athlete was thirty-eight and a half hours per week).
143. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supranote 134, § 17.1.7.1.
144. Id. § 17.1.7.3.2.
145. Id. § 17.02.18.
146. See id.
147. GOALS Study, supra note 132, at 2.
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are barred from pursuing, only about one-third of the Division I studentathletes involved in baseball, basketball, and football completed or
expected to undertake an internship during college. 148 Student-athletes
have also reported that their participation in athletics prevented them
from taking certain classes, and only 60% of Division I athletes reported
"feeling positive about their ability to keep up with their classes while
in-season. 049 In response, student-athletes tend to be "clustered" into
majors that are less rigorous or demanding (thereby
allowing the
50
student-athlete to devote more time to his or her sport). 1
As the plaintiffs alluded to in Berger, it is unclear why other
students who receive scholarships or who participate in extracurricular
151
activities do not face the same restrictions as NCAA student-athletes.
Emmert has acknowledged that the NCAA aspires to provide students
with professional coaches, trainers, support staff, and facilities. 15, If
student-athletes are being given professional resources, expected to
behave like professionals, and are controlled in a stricter manner than
ordinary college students, then 153
it is hard to see what makes them
"amateurs" besides mere rhetoric.
C. The NCAA and College Athletics: Big Business
Commercialism drives the NCAA and its members. Regardless of
whether schools are profiting from their athletic programs (and many
are), the most essential point-for purposes of coverage under the FLSA
and application of the economic realities test-is that they generate
extraordinary revenue as a direct result of their student-athletes' work
and participation. Because revenue has increased exponentially over the

148. Id. at 5.
149. Id.at 3. However, the trends in these areas have been improving. Thanks, in part, to the
ability of online classes, student-athletes are increasingly able to take the classes they want, and the
majority do not regret their academic choices. See id
150.

See Doug Lederman, Concerns About Clustering, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov. 20, 2008,

9:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/11/20/cluster (noting that the NCAA's
academic policies may be "driving athletes" or "prompting colleges to push athletes into majors that
are perceived as being easier").
151.
152.

See Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845, 849, 856-57 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
Interview
with Mark Emmert,
President, NCAA,
PBS (Feb.

14,

2011),

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/money-and-march-madness/interviews/markemmert.html.
153.
Athletes

See generally Josh Freedman, Beyond Northwestern: Should Non-Football College
Be
Able
To
Unionize,
FORBES
(Apr.
8,
2014),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/j oshfreedman/2014/04/08/beyond-northwestem-should-non-footballcollege-athletes-be-able-to-unionize/#6e 1928c51801.
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last several decades, athletic programs are now run like stand-alone
organizations and have been taken over, in part, by television executives
and other corporate entities. For major programs, it is clear that the
schools derive a huge benefit from athletics.
There is little controversy over the statement that college athletics
has turned into an enormous business. From 2004 through 2014, the
median generated revenues of schools that are members of the "Football
Bowl Subdivision" ("FBS") have increased by 94.4%. 154 The median
total generated revenue for an FBS school in 2014 was $44,455,000,
which was up over 6% from the previous year.1 55 During the 2014-2015
school year, at least fifty-six public schools exceeded the $50 million
mark.1 56 The dollars come from multiple sources, but television rights
deals make up the majority of the earnings. 157 At the NCAA level,
"CBS paid about $800 million to ... televise the three-week 2014 men's
basketball tournament."1 58 ESPN received a slight discount from the
NCAA and is paying a mere $610 million per year over the next twelve
years to broadcast three Division I football playoff games.159
Given these numbers, it is hard to believe the NCAA's claims that
"[o]nly 24 FBS schools generated more revenue than they spent in 2014,
and that many athletic programs needed their colleges and universities to
cover their expenses."1 60 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is reason for
disbelief. Some argue that the failure to turn a profit is "the result of an
athletic director's decision to outspend income." 161 And one wonders

154. 2004-2014 Revenues & Expenses, Division I IntercollegiateAthletics Program Report
Division
I
Report
[hereinafter
"NCAA
Revenue"],
NCAA,
12
(2014),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Division%201%20RE%20report.pdf.
Generated
revenues include revenues that are produced by each school's athletics department, including "ticket
sales, radio and television receipts, alumi contributions, guarantees, [and] royalties." Id. at 9. The
FBS refers to "those institutions that play at least 60 percent of their regular-season football games
against other FBS institutions, [as well as all but four basketball games] ... There are also
requirements for attendance, scheduling and financial aid." Id. at 106; see also-About Division I
supra note 1.
155. NCAA Revenue, supranote 154, at 17. Median total revenue in 2014 was $62,275,000, up
0.6 percent from the year before. Id.
156. See Berkowitz, supra note 2.157. Branch, supranote 113.
158. Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, The Case for Paying College Athletes, 29 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 115, 120 (2015).
159. Id.
160. Brian Bumsed, Athletic Departments That Make More Than They Spend Still a Minority,
NCAA (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/athleticsdepartments-make-more-they-spend-still-minority.
161. Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Playing in the Red, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/2015/11/23/running-up-the-bills.
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why-if colleges and universities are toeing the budgetary line when it
comes to their athletics programs-the schools continue to sustain such
robust programs. For example, economists Allen R. Sanderson and John
J. Siegfried point out that when universities incur financial losses, they
"double down" and spend "even greater amounts on salaries for coaches
and improving physical facilities rather than interpreting losses as a
signal to redeploy assets elsewhere. 162 This was certainly the case at
Florida State, which in the face of a $2 million budget deficit managed
to raise salaries for non-coaching administrators from $7.7 million to
$15 million. 163
Likewise the University of Auburn, apparently
unencumbered by its $17 million budget deficit, decided to buy a new
$13.9 million scoreboard for its football stadium, along with two private
jets valued at over $14 million total.164 As opposed to demanding
accountability, "[c]olleges generally treat athletic departments as standalone organizations, free to spend every dollar they earn. Colleges also
rarely prevent athletic directors from outspending their earnings, often
allowing them to charge mandatory student fees 'and
take university
65
money away from other departments to cover costs."'
Moreover, college athletic departments have seemingly been taken
over by this move toward commercialism. A 2008 strategic plan for
Duke University Athletics revealed that it has become "increasingly
difficult" to "remain competitive at the Division I level without
acquiescing to some level of commercialism."' 66 According to the
report:

162.

Sanderson & Siegfried, supranote 158, at 121 (identifying six potential rationales for this

behavior); see Maxwell Strachan, NCAA Schools Can Absolutely Afford to Pay College Athletes,
Economists Say, HUFF. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/27/ncaa-

pay-student-athletes n_6940836.html (quoting David Berri, a professor of economics at Southern
Utah University) ("They're nonprofits, and their incentive is to spend every cent that comes in.
That doesn't mean they aren't making money. That just means they spent all of it.").
163. Sally Jenkins, College Athletic Departments are Paying Themselves to Lose Money,
WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/flagrant-foulcollege-sports-bosses-cry-poor-while-spending-lavishly/2015/11/25/f2d6d130-937d- Ile5-b5e4279b4501e8a6_story.html. Though the athletic departments in the top five college athletic

conferences earns a median of $93.1 million in revenue, pay for administrators has risen by $300
million in the last decade. Id.
164.
165.

Id.; Hobson & Rich, supra note 161.
Hobson& Rich, supra note 161.

166. UnrivaledAmbition: A Strategic Plan for Duke Athletics, DUKE ATHLETICS 11 (Apr. 26,
2008), http://www.goduke.com//pdf2/127971.pdfDB OEM ID=4200 ("[T]he revenue from
advertisers and corporate sponsors has become a very important supplement to long established
revenue streams but that means that each year our amateur student-athletes take the field a with a
corporate logo displayed on their uniform beside Duke.").
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We no longer determine at what time we will play our
games, because they are scheduled by TV executives.
This is particularly troubling for basketball, which may
be required to play weeknight games away from home
at 9:00 p.m. The potential impact on academic work is
obvious, as students are required to board a flight at
2:00 a.m., arriving back at their dorms at 4:00 or 5:00
a.m., and then are expected to go to class, study, and
otherwise act as if it were a normal school-day. In return
for large television contracts, we have surrendered
control over a function that can profoundly influence the
experience of our students.167
Though it may be tidy and logical for a court to default to the
notion that a school's core mission is "academics" and not "athletics," an
institution's priorities should be questioned when the spending on
athletics dwarfs what is spent on academics, and when the average salary
for football coaches increases at a faster pace than it does for professors
or university presidents. 68
This overwhelming focus on athletics is also illustrated by
recruiting practices, as competitive programs engage in what amounts to
an arms race to secure verbal commitments from high school athletes
before they have even taken the SAT.1 69 Then, once students arrive, the
emphasis on academic eligibility has caused several schools to engage in
certain practices (or, at least, to look the other way in the face of such
practices) that no rational observer could construe as being in an
ordinary student's best interest. 170 At the University of North Carolina,

167. Id.
168. See Laura Pappano, How Big-Time Sports Ate College Life, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/education/edlife/how-big-time-sports-ate-college-life.html

("[B]etween 1985 and 2010, average salaries at public universities rose thirty-two percent for full
professors, 90 percent for presidents and 650 percent for football coaches."). See also id.(noting
that "[s]pending on high-profile sports grew at double to triple the pace of that on academics").
169. See Recruiting,NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/recruiting (last visited
Oct. 21, 2017).
170. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, In Fake Classes Scandal UNC Fails Its Athletes and WhistleBlower, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2014, 7:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0227/in-fake-classes-scandal-unc-fails-its-athletes-whistle-blower (highlighting the academic scandal
at the University of North Carolina); Special Report on Oklahoma State Football: Part 2-The
http://www.si.com/college2013),
(Sept.
11,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
Academics,
football/2013/09/1 i/oklahoma-state-part-2-academics (detailing numerous examples of Oklahoma
State's student-athletes receiving improper assistance with academic papers, exams, and grades
from counselors, tutors, and professors).
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for instance,, many student-athletes who lacked even "basic literacy
skills" were herded by their academic advisors into "no-show" lecture
classes that never met, a practice that lasted for at least two decades
172
through 2011.171 Likewise, the widespread practice of "redshirting"
incoming student-athletes might help win national championships (by
giving the student-athlete more time to hone his skills and physically
develop), but it is not necessarily in a student-athlete's best academic
interests to remain in school-where, as this paper continues to point
out, his earnings are restricted-for longer than he needs to complete his
academic degree.
Further, many Division I athletes, especially those in high-profile
sports, clearly do not view their athletic careers as mere supplements to
their educational experience. For example, according to the NCAA,
"about 40% of [the Division I men's basketball] players who enter
Division I directly out of high school depart their initial school by the
end of their sophomore year."'1 73 Though this percentage is not too far
out of line with the transfer rates of college students generally, 174 around
90% of the men's basketball transfers said they were transferring for
"athletic reasons., 175 Due to poor academic planning, these transfers
often wind up losing academic credits
and, in turn, registering lower
1 76
non-transfers.'
than
rates
graduation
Though the NCAA's rules and regulations and formal practices
appear to prioritize academics, its member schools and the NCAA itself
are doubtlessly motivated by revenue. Cathedrals (passing for stadiums)
are erected, humongous television deals are signed, and the fiction of
amateurism continues to persist. Some, if not most, student-athletes
almost certainly benefit from their participation in college athletics.
After all, many of them are given scholarships and living stipends that
help ease what would otherwise be a much larger financial burden to
171. See Barrett, supra note 170.
172. NCAA Transfer Terms, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/current/transfer-terms (last
visited Oct. 21, 2017) ("[R]edshirting refers to someone who is enrolled full-time'at a school, but
does not play for an academic year for the sole purpose of saving a season of competition.").
173. Tracking Transfer in Division I Men's Basketball [hereinafter "Tracking Transfer"] (June
28, 2017, 10:43 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/tracking-transfer-division-imen-s-basketball.
174. Roughly thirty-seven percent of college students transfer at least once. See Transfer &
Mobility: A National View of Student Movement in Postsecondary Institutions,Fall 2008 Cohort,
NAT'L STUDENT CLEARINGHOUSE RESEARCH CENTER 8 (July 2015).

175. Tracking Transfer, supra note 173. According to the NCAA's GOALS study, "[m]en's
and women's basketball stands out as a sport where the decision to enroll or to transfer... often
depends on the coach at that college." GOALS Study, supranote 133, at 2.
176. Tracking Transfer, supra note 173.
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attend school. However, student-athletes also make serious tradeoffs
that are not necessarily optimal for student-athletes who are supposed to
be "students" first. The dedication that it takes to be a Division I athlete,
along with the financial and academic opportunities that must be passed
over in order to remain NCAA compliant and academically eligible,
creates a burden that is not there for other students.
With commercialism at its core, the least the NCAA and its
members could do is to make sure that its student-athletes are getting a
fair piece of the pie. In the absence of such a gesture, any federal court
that is undertaking a realistic economic realities test should look to the
NCAA's spurious ideal of "amateurism," its unrelenting drive for
revenue, and the extent to which student-athletes are dependent
(economically and otherwise) on their schools.
IV. COLLEGE PLAY FOR PAY: MOVING FORWARD
This Part first addresses the relatively benign consequences that

would likely result from a court's decision to compel the NCAA, or one
of its member institutions, to leave its outdated notion of "amateurism"
behind. Second, this Part briefly outlines some of the alternative
proposals that a court or legislative body may consider in lieu of
granting student-athletes "employee" status under the FLSA.
A. The Consequences of Forsaking "Amateurism"
The consequences of forsaking the amateur model of athletics
would likely not be too severe for the NCAA. Some, such as NCAA
President Mark Emmert, have argued that "if amateurism goes away, so
will the games as we know them now."' 77 He believes that allowing
student-athletes to be paid would "change what college sports is all
about., 178 This Section, however, argues that Emmert (and others who
make similar arguments) overestimate the extent to which paying
student-athletes would affect college sports' place in our society.
179
"College sports are deeply inscribed in the culture of our nation.'
This Article has already established that the NCAA and its members
have secured billions of dollars through ticket sales, media rights deals,
and other revenue streams. Major college sporting events, such as the
177. Sara Ganim, Paying College Athletes Would Hurt Traditions, NCAA Chief Emmert
Testifies, CNN (June 19, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/19/us/ncaa-obannon-lawsuit-trial.
178. Id.
179. Branch, supra note 113.
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March Madness Basketball Tournament, are comparable to the Super
Bowl in terms of the television ad revenue generated and the attention
given by national and local sports media.1 80 In 2005, ESPN even created
a dedicated network for college sports,
which offers "year-round insight
'1 81
on basketball and football recruiting."
Thus, the argument that conferring employee status on studentathletes would somehow jolt the nation out of its craze for college sports
is spurious at best. Commercialization and the infusion of capital into
college athletics have allowed college sports fans to satiate their
appetites for more games and more coverage. 182 Schools have built-in
fan bases (i.e., current students and alumni) that already spend money to
purchase expensive season tickets and cable packages. 183 These same
fans have also spent years becoming desensitized to the corporate culture
that has gripped college sports.1 84 It is possible that eliminating
"amateurism" in college athletics would actually work in the NCAA's
favor because "hypocrisy and corruption will no longer be core
components [of supporting the NCAA]." 8 5
Fortunately, the NCAA would not be wading into uncharted
territory if it were to decide (or if a court were to decide) that the
principles of "amateurism" should be heavily relaxed to accommodate
student pay. The Olympics, which originally embraced "the most
stringent definition of amateurism," decided to allow professionals to
compete in its competitions in the mid-1990s. 186 Like the NCAA, the
180. See, e.g., Christina Austin, The Major League Money Behind March Madness, the Super
Bowl, and the World Cup, FORTUNE (Apr. 3, 2015), http://fortune.com/march-madness-super-bowlworld-cup-revenue.
181. Press Release, Derek Volner, ESPNU Celebrates Its 10th Anniversary Today, ESPN
MEDIAZONE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://espnmediazone.com/us/press-releases/2015/03/espnu-celebrates10th-anniversary-today.
182. See generally Pappano, supra note 168 (highlighting that the "explosion in televised
games has spread sports fever well beyond traditional hotbeds" and that campus life at many
schools "revolves around not just going to games but lining up and camping out to get into them").
183. See Earl Smith, SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT AND SOCIAL THEORY 69 (2009) (arguing that
college sports fans "may have little interest in examining... the extent to which the NCAA...
achieves its stated purpose of retaining 'a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics
and professional sports').
184. See id. at 69-70.
185. Patrick Hruby, The Olympics Show Why College Sports Should Give Up on Amateurism,
ATLANTIC (July 25, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/07/theolympics-show-why-college-sports-should-give-up-on-amateurism/260275 (arguing that the appeal
of college athletics is "tribal").
186. See id. Even athletes who merely "decided" to go pro were banned from Olympic
competition. Id. The original Olympic Charter allowed only amateurs to compete in the Olympic
Games. The Charter defined "amateur" as "one who participates and always has participated in
sport as an avocation without material gain of any kind.?' Eligibility Rules of the International
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International Olympic Committee ("IOC") had strict rules against

commercialization, and it doled out strict sanctions for athletes that
broke its rules.' 8 7 For decades, Avery Brundage, president of the IOC
from 1952 to 1972, maintained that amateurism had to be preserved in
order to ensure the Olympics' success.18 8 But over the past several
decades, the Olympics has become a completely commercialized
entity. 8 9 The IOC actually "expunged the word amateur from its charter
in 1986," and professional athletes now dominate the competition.1 90
The loss of amateurism and so-called "purity of sport" turned out not to
be the destructive force that many thought it would be.1 91 At least, it
hasn't hurt the bottom line. In 2011, for example, Comcast paid $4.38
billion for exclusive media rights to the Olympics from 2014 to 2020.192
Meanwhile, the 2016 Summer Olympics
saw Comcast secure a record
193
$1.2 billion in advertising sales.
The NCAA has already taken steps to allow some of its studentathletes who compete in the Olympics and other world competitions to
be compensated for their efforts. Under its bylaws, student-athletes are
permitted to accept cash for winning medals, stipends to cover training
expenses, and sponsored apparel, all while maintaining college
eligibility. 194 Such exceptions, seemingly inconsistent with the NCAA's
Olympic
Committee
(1964),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic%/2OCharter/OlympicCharter-throughtime/I 964
-OlympicCharterEligibilityRules of the IOC.pdf. Athletes who received or had received pay
for participation in sport were not eligible to compete. Id.
187. See
Bob
Greene,
What
Changed
the
Olympics
Forever, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/22/opinion/greene-olympics-amateurs (last updated July 23, 2012,
11:43 AM).
188. See id
189. See Hruby, supra note 185 (comparing the $30 million in sponsorship revenue generated
by the 1980 amateur games in Lake Placid to the $840 million in sponsorship revenue generated by
the 2002 professional games in Salt Lake City).
190. See Branch, supra note 113.
191. See Hruby, supra note 185 ("People's love of competition trumps anybody's love of
athlete poverty.").
192. Richard Sandomir, NBC Wins U.S. Television Rights to Four More Olympics, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/sports/nbc-wins-tv-rights-to-next-fourolympics.html.
193. Jason Lynch, $1.2 Billion and Counting: How NBCUniversal Secured Its Biggest
Olympics
Advertising
Windfall
Ever,
ADWEEK
(Aug.
4,
2016),
http://www.adweek.com/news/television/1 2-billion-and-counting-how-nbcuniversal-secured-itsbiggest-olympics-advertising-windfall-ever-172697.
One executive remarked that this figure
surpassed what was once thought to be an "unobtainable threshold." Id.
194. See Steve Berkowitz, Olympics Offer Rare Chancefor NCAA Athletes to be Paid,USA
TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/rio-20 16/20 16/08/02/paying-ncaa-collegeathletes-at-rio-olympics-kyle-snyder-katie-ledecky/87709714 (last updated Aug. 2, 2016, 7:10 PM).
For example, USA Wrestling paid Kyle Snyder, a national champion for the Ohio State University
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other strict prohibitions, at least work to incentivize high-performing
student-athletes to stay in school while they compete on the world stage.
On the other hand, the NCAA's amateurism principles penalize
would-be student-athletes who participate in sports where the decision to
turn professional must be made earlier than college. This was the case
for Jordyn Wieber, a member of the 2012 U.S., Olympic gold medal
gymnastics team. Wieber turned professional before traveling to the
Olympics so that she could take advantage of the financial benefits that
Olympic sponsorships could offer; however, this meant that she had to
forego collegiate competition altogether. 195 It seems illogical to declare
that Wieber should be ineligible to compete in college because she
accepted endorsement deals prior to the enrollment, but her Olympic
teammates-who may be able to accept greater Olympic bonuses
depending on individual achievements-are able to maintain their
eligibility. The NCAA's rigid adherence to "amateurism" makes little
sense in this context. If anything, these types of rules misalign
incentives, as top student-athletes may have more to gain by trying to
turn professional as soon as possible.
There is also little reason to think that paying student-athletes
would undermine education. Schools already employ and pay students
for working in the dining halls, campus resource centers, and yes, school
athletic events. Just as students working in the dining halls do not
abandon their studies in order to make sandwiches, student-athletes
would not abandon their education in the face of just compensation (nor
would they be able to given the NCAA's academic eligibility
requirements).
And it is not as though the refusal to pay student-athletes appears to
benefit the students themselves. NCAA Division I football players and
men's and women's basketball players tend to graduate at rates less than
other full-time students.1 96 Further, the NCAA has recognized that an
Buckeyes, $250,000 after Snyder won the gold medal at the 2016 Olympics. Id. Snyder has
continued to compete for Ohio State since the Olympics. Id.
195.

Gymnasts Face Complicated Choice: Olympic Endorsements or College Careers,

ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/sports/Gymnasts face complicated_choiceOlympic-endorsem
entsor collegecareers-387664081.html (last updated July 26, 2017, 8:52 AM).
196. 2016 Adjusted Graduation Gap Report: NCAA FBS Football, COLL. SPORT RESEARCH
INST. 1-2 (Oct. 19, 2016), http://csri-sc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2016-Football-AGGReport PublishFinal_10-19-2016.pdf, 2016 Adjusted Graduation Gap Report: NCAA Division-I
Basketball, COLL. SPORT RESEARCH INST. 2, 5 (Apr. 6, 2016), http://csri-sc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/2016-Basketball-AGG-ReportFinal.pdf.
The NCAA disputes these
numbers. See Paul Steinbach, Record NCAA Graduation Rates Don't Tell The Whole Story,
ATHLETIC BUSINESS (Dec. 2011), http://www.athleticbusiness.com/Goveming-Bodies/record-ncaa-
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overwhelming percentage of student-athletes in basketball and football
197
operate under the false belief that they are going to turn professional.
*But in reality, only about 1.6% of college football players and 1.1% of
collegiate male basketball players will end up joining a professional
league after leaving school. 198 The failure to compensate studentathletes does little to serve their academic and professional interests.
B. Alternatives to FLSA Recognition
There have been several proposals put forward for how the NCAA
and/or its members might "compensate" student-athletes outside of
FLSA recognition. This Section describes three of those alternatives.
1. Optional Education
Jamie Nicole Johnson argues that universities and student-athletes
"would benefit from the legal recognition of college athletes as
employees, removing athletes from the classroom, and from
compensating them as legal employees." 199 She advocates for what she
calls the "Employable Athlete Model," which would allow studentathletes the option to enroll in courses and to receive a capped salary
from the college or university. z° Johnson believes that this model will
allow athletes to better prepare for their career goals and will give
universities the freedom to reallocate the resources previously provided
to grant-in-aid student athletes.20 1
Though Johnson's idea is not without merit, adoption of such a
model would be a step in the wrong direction. Whereas compensating
student-athletes under a statute like the FLSA would serve as recognition
that student-athletes are similar to other student employees, 2°2 removing
graduation-rates-don-t-tell-the-whole-story.html (accounting for the discrepancies that tend to arise
between these numbers and those promulgated by the NCAA).
NCAA,
the
Association,
of
NCAA
State
2015
Emmert,
197. Mark
'http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/2015-ncaa-state-association (last visited Oct. 21,
2017) (noting that 75 percent of Division I men's basketball players believe that they will play
professionally).
198. Estimated Probability of Competing in Pro Athletics, NCAA (Mar. 10, 2017),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professionalathletics.
199. Johnson, supra note 47, at 999 ("These reforms will allow athletes to fully commit to
athletic performance and earn protection under state workers' compensation laws.").
200. Id. at 1003. This salary would replace the student-athlete's grant-in-aid scholarship. Id.
201. See id. at 1004, 1007.
202. Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 5, Berger v. NCAA, No. 1:14-cv-1710
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student-athletes from the classroom altogether would turn colleges and
universities into a de facto minor professional league with the sole goal
of breeding athletes (no longer "student"-athletes) for the professional
game. In contrast, what this Article advocates-extension of the FLSA
to cover student-athletes--does not take the "student" out of studentathlete. Rather, FLSA extension serves to compensate student-athletes
for work performed while still preserving the academic obligations that
are currently in place.
2. Academic Credit
As opposed to making education optional, others argue that studentathletes should be provided with academic credit (in lieu of
compensation) for their participation in college athletics.2 °3 M. Tyler
Brown notes that "[p]roviding academic credit to college athletes simply
for academic participation [in athletic courses such as Football] would
violate NCAA policies against providing special benefits to athletes
based on athlete status. '2 °4 But according to Brown, schools could
circumvent this rule by creating an "internship seminar class, in which
all students of the general student body participating in internships must
enroll. 2 °5 These classes, says Brown, would teach "valuable topics
generally applicable to all types of work ...[and] function as a practical
work-skills course sponsored by the school., 20 6 Brown compares this
type of class to those that provide credit for other extracurricular
activities and majors, such as music or drama.20 7
Some non-Division I athletic programs do currently allow their
athletes to receive academic credit for playing a varsity sport. At Ithaca
College (a Division III program), for example, students may receive 0.5
credits simply by signing up for the sport and notifying a coach that he
or she wishes to receive credit. 20 8 Further, Vassar College (also Division
III) allows students to earn up to two credits-satisfying Vassar's twocredit physical education requirement-for their participation on a

(S.D. Ind. Mar. 18, 2015).
203. M. Tyler Brown, College Athletics Internships: The Case for Academic Credit in College
Athletics, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 1855, 1855 (2014).
204. Id.at 1895.
205. Id.

206.

Id.

207.
208.

Id. at 1897.
Student-Athlete

Academic

and

Eligibility

Guidelines,

ITHACA

C.,

http://www.ithaca.edu/policies/vol7/athletics/070602 (last updated Aug. 1, 2017).
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varsity sports team.2 °9
It makes sense to allow students who are participating in varsity
sports to receive physical education credits for doing so. But it makes
less sense to set up whole classes, such as those advocated for by Brown,
which would only serve to take up even more of a student-athlete's time
in the name of college athletics. These classes would not change the
basic premise that student-athletes are substantially controlled by and
economically dependent on their schools and should be entitled to the
basic protections that the FLSA provides. If anything, these classes
would impose additional burdens and time constraints on studentathletes, potentially precluding them from other classes or opportunities
they wish to pursue.
3. Outside Profit
Perhaps the most interesting suggestion for allowing athletes to be
"compensated" comes from Andrew Zimbalist, an economist and sports
industry consultant. He argues that the NCAA should re-define
"amateur" as "one who is not paid a salary for his or her sport., 2 10 This
would allow student-athletes to earn outside income, secure an agent,
enter a professional sports draft, "and not become ineligible to play
college sports until they sign their first professional contract. ,211 Patrick
Hruby likens this to the model utilized by the Olympics, which "doesn't
pay participants [but] ... simply allows them to get paid., 21 2 Hruby
argues that allowing student-athletes to appear in commercials or to
otherwise profit from their name, image, and likeness would "help grow
' 21 3 and "bring
and share [the NCAA's] wealth
the underground college
21 4
sports economy into the light.,
This proposal actually brings the NCAA's concept of the "studentathlete" into focus by allowing student-athletes to make money through

209. See PHED 320 - Varsity Athletics, VASSAR COLL. COURSE CATALOG,
http://catalog.vassar.edu/preview-coursenopop.php?catoid=7&coid=62111
(last visited Oct. 21,
2017).
210. Andrew Zimbalist, Paying College Athletes, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2015, 12:17
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-zimbalist/paying-college-athletes-taketwo_b_6961314.html.
211. Id.
212. Hruby, supra note 185.
213. Id.
214. Patrick Hruby, Should College Athletes Get Paid? Ending the Debate, Once andfor All,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/04/shouldcollege-athletes-get-paid-ending-the-debate-once-and-for-all/236809.
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outside endeavors just as every other college student is able to do. The
problem with this model is that it heavily favors only a select few
athletes who play for the top programs in the highest revenue-generating
sports. National advertisers would certainly clamor to sign the star
quarterback at the University of Alabama and the dominant point guard
at the University of Kentucky. Other, less-visible members of these
same teams (as well as student-athletes who compete for less renowned
programs or in less popular sports) would be unlikely to receive the
same interest, despite being just as economically dependent on the
institution as their peers. FLSA extension would not discriminate
against these or other student-athletes and would ensure that all studentathletes are compensated for the revenue they help produce and the
control to which they are subjected.
C. The Response to FLSA Recognition
If a court were to eventually extend coverage of the FLSA to
student-athletes, the DOL (no matter its position) and Congress would
have to figure out how a "pay for play" regime could be put into place.
The most direct response would be for Congress to include studentathletes as one of the "exemptions" to the FLSA's minimum wage and
maximum hours requirements. 2 15
Under Section 213, if certain
conditions are met, various classes of employees do not need to be paid
the mandated minimum wage. 216 For example, certain "computer
employees" are exempt from the FLSA's minimum wage so long as they
are compensated at a minimum rate of $455 per week or $27.65 per
hour.2 17 Further, the FLSA exempts employees who are employed by an
"amusement or recreational establishment, organized camp, or religious
or non-profit educational conference center" if the operation does not
run for more than seven months in any calendar year or if a certain
revenue threshold is not met.21 8
These same principles could be applied to student-athletes by
exempting them from the FLSA's minimum wage requirements, so long
as they are paid a certain salary.
This would help avoid the

215. 29 U.S.C. § 213.
216. See id. § 213(a)(1)(17).
217. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #17(A):
EXEMPTION FOR EXECUTIVE,
ADMINISTRATIVE, PROFESSIONAL, COMPUTER & OUTSIDE SALES EMPLOYEES UNDER THE FAIR

LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), https://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/fsl7a_overview.pdf
updated July 2008).
218. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (2012).
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administrative headaches that would come from school officials having
to account for the FLSA's maximum hours and overtime provisions.
Basing a student-athlete's pay on the revenue generated by his or her
university, or even the revenue that is attributable to his or her team
would also be an interesting tack, though the details of such a system
may be too convoluted to be put into action.
V. CONCLUSION

Advocates for student-athlete pay under the FLSA should not be
disheartened by the court's ruling in Berger. Every employer-employee
relationship under the FLSA is premised on the economic dependency of
the purported employee on the purported employer. Instead of truly
analyzing the economic and functional relationship of student-athletes
with their schools, the Southern District of Indiana justified its decision
not to extend the FLSA based on questionable policy rationales,
including the NCAA's tradition of amateurism and the apparent inaction
of the DOL to press for student-athlete compensation. The court did not
grapple with the reality that student-athletes are controlled by their
schools in ways that ordinary students are not, devote an extensive
amount of time to activities that produce a significant stream of revenue
for the institution, and are sometimes forced to forego academic
opportunities if they wish to maintain their scholarships. It is time to
recognize college play in the FLSA.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
On December 5, 2015, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the Southern District of Indiana's ruling that student-athletes,
as a matter of law, are not employees under the FLSA. 219 The Seventh
Circuit's analysis of the plaintiffs' claims largely mirrored that of the
district court's. After declining to adopt a multifactor economic realities
test, the court once again focused on the "revered tradition of
amateurism in college sports"' 2 2° According to the court, this "longstanding tradition defines the economic reality of the relationship
between student athletes and their schools., 221 The court also relied on
the DOL's failure to intervene on behalf of student-athletes, rejected the

219. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016).
220. Id. at 291 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)).
221. Id.
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argument that student-athletes are comparable to work-study
participants, and highlighted a multitude of other reasons why students
decide to participate in college athletics.222
However, Judge David Hamilton, in a concurring opinion,
emphasized the fact that the University of Pennsylvania plaintiffs were
not offered athletic scholarships and did not participate in a revenuegenerating sport. 223 He suggested, therefore, that the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning might not apply as strongly "to students who receive athletic
scholarships to participate in so-called revenue sports like Division I
men's basketball and FBS football. 224 Judge Hamilton stated:
In those sports, economic reality and the tradition of
amateurism may not point in the same direction. Those
sports involve billions of dollars of revenue for colleges
and universities. Athletic scholarships are limited to the
cost of attending school. With economic reality as our
guide, as I believe it should be, there may be room for
further debate, perhaps with a developed factual record
rather than bare pleadings, for cases 225addressing
employment status for a variety of purposes.

Judge Hamilton's concurrence was disregarded, however, in
Dawson v. NCAA, where the Northern District of California dismissed a
former Division I football player's FLSA claim that the NCAA and the
PAC-12 Conference ("PAC-12") were the joint employers of studentathletes playing Division I FBS football in the PAC-12.22 6 The court
framed the ultimate question as "whether student athletes can be
considered 'employees"' and noted that the Bonnette multifactor test
was not well-suited for this inquiry. 227 Instead, the court analyzed the
"true nature of the relationship" and the "circumstances of the whole
activity., 228 The court concluded that there was "no legal basis for
finding" that student-athletes were "employees" under the FLSA, 229 and
222.

See id. at 292-93.

223.

Id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring).

224.
225.
226.
alleged,

Id.
Id.
Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 408 (N.D. Cal. 2017). As a result, the plaintiff
the defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay these student-athletes the minimum

wage for all hours worked, including overtime. Id. at 403.
227. Id. at 405.
228.
229.

Id.
Id. at 408. In so ruling, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Berger was
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it placed no weight on Judge Hamilton's concurrence, instead noting that
"he did not consider, much less find, that the football players are
'employees' under FLSA., 230 However, the court failed to engage in a
substantive examination of the benefits that student-athletes confer on
their schools. Relying once again on the notion that there is a "long
tradition of amateurism in college sports," the court merely concluded
that football programs, unlike work-study programs, "exist for the
benefit of students and, in some limited circumstances, also benefit the
school., 231 The actual extent to which these programs benefit the school,
the court did not care to inquire.
Despite the apparent setback in Dawson, student-athletes have
refused to end the fight. On September 26, 2017, Lawrence "Poppy"
Livers filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the
NCAA and twenty Division I Member Schools, arguing that studentathletes receiving athletic scholarships and who are therefore required
"to participate in NCAA athletics under daily supervision of full-time
coaching and training staff' are employees entitled to the FLSA's
protections.232 The Complaint distinguishes itself from Berger and
Dawson and seeks, among other remedies, any unpaid wages that are
owed by the defendants under the FLSA. 33
Judge Hamilton's concurrence in Berger and Livers' Complaint in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania demonstrate that there are still
arguments to be made under the FLSA for student-athlete recognition
and that "college play for pay" is not dead.

distinguishable because if involved student-athletes who did not earn the kind of "massive revenue"
that is earned by Division I football players. Id. at 405-06. It found instead that "the premise that
revenue generation is determinative of employment status is not supported by the case law." Id. at
406.
230. Id. at 406.
231. Id. at 407.
232. Complaint at 1, Livers v. NCAA et al., Case No. 2:17-CV-04271 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26,
2017).
233. Id. at 3. Plaintiff is arguing that the plaintiffs in Berger were students of the University of
Pennsylvania, which does not enter into scholarship agreements with student-athletes. Id. at 2.
Further, the plaintiffs distinguished Dawson by noting that the plaintiff in Dawson sued only an
NCAA member conference (the PAC-12) and failed to sue any NCAA member schools. Id.
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